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NOTE




In August of 1997, the American Bar Association Commission on
the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, widely known as
the Ethics 2000 Commission, began its work evaluating the ethical
practices of lawyers and recommending changes to the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.' One of the rules the Ethics 2000
Commission examined was Model Rule 3.8, which addresses the
"Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor."2
Model Rule 3.8(d) is controversial, not least for its severe lack of
enforcement.3 Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor in a criminal trial to
disclose evidence that is favorable to the defendant,' a requirement
similar to the constitutional disclosure requirements established by
the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland.5 The Court in Brady held
that a prosecutor commits a Due Process violation, requiring reversal
of a conviction, when it is shown that the prosecutor withheld
favorable, material evidence.6
Although addressing the same issue, there are significant
differences between the ethical requirements of the Model Rule and
the legal requirements of the Brady Rule.' For example, the ethics
* I am grateful to Professor Bruce A. Green for his invaluable guidance. I would like
to thank my family for their continuing love and support.
1. See Ethics 2000 - Comm'n on the Evaluation of the Rules of Profl Conduct,
Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, available at httpJ/wvv.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html
(last visited Sept. 24, 2000) ("The ethical standards promulgated by the ABA have
been adopted by virtually every jurisdiction, implicitly acknowledging that the
Association is a recognized leader and the appropriate forum for discussing, drafting
and adopting rules governing lawyer conduct.").
2. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R 3.8 (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules]. See
infra note 38 for the text of Rule 3.8.
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. See infra Part I.B.1.
5. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see infra Part I.B.2.
6. See infra Part I.B.2.
7. See infra Part I.B.3.
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rule does not limit the prosecutor's disclosure obligation only to
evidence that is material to the case. In addition, the Brady Rule,
unlike the ethics rule, dictates that the prosecution must disclose
evidence that could be used to impeach a prosecution witness.
The Ethics 2000 Commission considered but rejected any change to
the text of Rule 3.8(d).8 It did, however, recommend amending the
comment to Rule 3.8 to state in part that "[e]vidence tending to
negate the guilt of the accused includes evidence that materially tends
to impeach a government witness." 9 Thus, the Commission suggests
clarifying that impeachment evidence is included under the
prosecutor's ethical duty to disclose, but only where the evidence is
material to the case. This raises an important question: Should the
disclosure obligation of Rule 3.8(d) go further than Brady and require
the disclosure of all evidence, regardless of materiality? If not, should
Rule 3.8(d) be eliminated entirely, or alternatively, should it be
limited to include the materiality requirement of the Brady Rule?
Part I of this Note will discuss how lawyers, and prosecutors in
particular, are governed by legal and ethical obligations. Part I
focuses specifically on the legal and ethical duties of a prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence, and it first explains a prosecutor's
disclosure obligations under the ethics rules and then provides an
overview of the development of the constitutional standard of
disclosure set forth by the Supreme Court. Part I then looks at the
differences between Rule 3.8(d) and the Brady Rule and concludes
with an analysis of the prosecutor's ethical duty of disclosure with
regard to enforceability issues. Part II also presents the arguments in
support of and against eliminating the ethical rule altogether or
amending it to include a materiality requirement. Finally, this Note
argues that Model Rule 3.8(d) should remain unchanged because the
ethics rule sets a higher standard toward which a prosecutor should
strive.
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S LEGAL AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
At its foundation, the lawyer's role is as "a representative of clients,
an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice."1 Various legal restrictions
and ethics rules guide attorneys toward this aspirational definition.
Legal restrictions exist in the form of judicial decisions handed down
by the courts that govern a lawyer's behavior and in statutes enacted
8. See Proposed Rule 3.8- Public Discussion Draft, Ctr. for Prof 1 Responsibility,
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/rule38.htm1 (Apr. 13, 2000).
9. Id. at cmt.
10. Model Rules, supra note 2, at Preamble. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are promulgated by the American Bar Association and they govern lawyers'
conduct and provide professional discipline. Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding
Lawyers' Ethics 2 (1990).
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by state and federal legislatures.' Lawyers are also governed by
ethical standards, and every state has adopted its own set of ethics
rules that not only prescribe desirable behavior for lawyers but also
provide a basis for discipline in response to attorney misconduct."
Furthermore, judicial decisions will often comment on ethical
misconduct.1 3
This part discusses how ethical standards regulate all lawyers. It
then illustrates the additional legal and ethical duties applied to
prosecutors who are held to a different, and arguably higher, standard
of conduct than private lawyers and defense attorneys, notably the
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. This part
summarizes the prosecutor's ethical duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence as provided for in the rules that guide lawyers on their
ethical responsibilities, particularly under Rule 3.8(d) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. This part then addresses the law
established by Brady v. Maryland, which regulates disclosure in
criminal trials,14 discusses the different requirements of Rule 3.8(d)
and the Brady Rule. Finally, this part explains the treatment of Rule
3.8(d) in practice with regard to lax enforcement of this rule.
A. Role of the Lawyer
The Supreme Court has defined the role of the lawyer as an "officer
of the court" whose function is to further the interests of his clients
above the interest of the state.15 The ethical standards are the primary
means of regulating and defining the role of the lawyer. The ethics
rules govern a wide range of attorney conduct, from the lawyer's duty
of confidentiality 6 and restrictions on advertising," to rules regarding
admission to the Bar.
18
11. See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988)
(stating that "the court may direct a prosecutor to show cause why he should not be
disciplined and request the bar or the Department of Justice to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against him. The court may also chastise the prosecutor in a published
opinion."). In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide mandatory
rules that an attorney in a criminal case must follow. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
12. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 669, 678.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1993) (sanctioning
prosecutorial misconduct by mentioning prosecutor by name and chastising him in a
published opinion).
14. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
15. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973) ("[The duty of the lawyer,
subject to his role as an 'officer of the court,' is to further the interests of his clients by
all lawful means, even when those interests are in conflict with the interests of the
United States or of a State."); Freedman, supra note 10, at 9.
16. Model Rules, supra note 2, at R. 1.6 (entitled "Confidentiality of
Information").
17. Id. R. 7.2 (entitled "Advertising").
18. Id. R. 8.1 (entitled "Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters").
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The first official national ethical guidelines regulating lawyer
conduct were enacted in 1908 when the American Bar Association
("ABA") adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons"). 19
The Canons failed, however, to provide lawyers with sufficient
guidance regarding what was expected of them or how the guidelines
should be followed.2" These shortcomings led the ABA to replace the
Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code") in 1969.21 The Model Code, I essentially a redraft of the
Canons, is composed of Canons that are general ethical principles,
Ethical Considerations that provide aspirational guidelines, and
Disciplinary Rules that are mandatory.23 Critics, however, contend
that the Model Code is incoherent, inconsistent, and even
unconstitutional.24 In response to these criticisms, the ABA adopted
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") in 1983,
which provides an alternative to the Model Code.25
Standing on their own, the Model Code and Model Rules are no
more than suggestions of aspirational norms of professional conduct
and they lack the force of law.26 State supreme courts are vested with
the power to license lawyers, and state courts have supervisory
authority over the attorneys in their jurisdiction.27 In order to govern
the professional conduct of attorneys, the state supreme courts adopt
ethics rules that are based largely on either the Model Code or the
Model Rules.2 To give these ethics rules force, the state courts also
adopt disciplinary sanctions for violations.29 When appropriate, the
state courts hear disciplinary cases and choose the sanction to be
imposed. 0
19. Canons of Prof'l Ethics (1908).
20. See Freedman, supra note 10, at 4.
21. See id.
22. Model Code of Prof 1 Responsibility (1981) [hereinafter Model Code].
23. The preliminary statement of the Model Code defines the parts of the Model
Code as follows:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers .... The Ethical
Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive.... The
Disciplinary Rules, unlike Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in
character [and] state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
Id. at Preliminary Statement.
24. Freedman, supra note 10, at 4.
25. Model Rules, supra note 2.
26. See Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers,
65 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 38 (1996) ("[T]he ABA writes ethics codes and state supreme
courts give them legal effect.").
27. Id. at 37.
28. Id. at 40-41; Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 3441, 3443 (1999).
29. Schneyer, supra note 26, at 38-39.
30. Id. at 39.
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B. Disclosure Obligations for Prosecutors
While all lawyers are governed by legal and ethical rules,
prosecutors are subject to more stringent obligations.3 Unlike the
private lawyer or defense attorney whose obligation is to be a zealous
advocate on behalf of his client, the prosecutor is entrusted with the
duty to "seek justice" in addition to fulfilling her role as an advocate.n
The prosecutor has this duty to seek justice because she is a
representative, not of a single individual, but of the government and
society as a whole. 33
As the representative of a sovereign, the prosecutor enjoys powers
that other lawyers do not. For example, prosecutors have broad
discretion in deciding whom to prosecute and what charges to bring.'4
In addition, prosecutors have the benefit of a police force that
investigates their cases and gathers evidence for them.3 This broad
access puts defendants at a great disadvantage in preparing their
cases.36 In the adversary system in which the prosecutor operates, the
availability of these powers leads to great inequity between the
prosecution and the defense in a criminal trialY
Thus, the heightened ethical obligations of the prosecutor are
meant to ensure a fair process and minimize the disparity of resources
between the prosecution and defense in the criminal justice system.
The ethics rules written especially for prosecutors, therefore, impose
31. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham Urb.
LJ. 607, 615-16 (1999) [hereinafter Green, Justice].
32- See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Green, Justice, supra note
31, at 612; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 46 (1991) [hereinafter Zacharias,
Justice].
33. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 759 (1986). As Professor
Bruce A. Green explains, the prosecutor works under heightened requirements
because of her role as the representative of the sovereign. See Green, Justice, supra
note 31, at 634. The sovereign, according to Green, has the responsibility to see that
justice is done, which is more than just convicting the guilty. Justice requires a fair
process. See id. at 642-43. As the lawyer for the sovereign, this responsibility is passed
on to the prosecutor. See id. at 634. Prosecutors are therefore distinguished from
other government lawyers and from private lawyers by "the identity of the client, the
amount of authority delegated to the lawyer to act on behalf of the client and the
nature of the client's interests and ends in the criminal context." Id. at 633; Michael Q.
English, Note, A Prosecutor's Use of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a Crime in
Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68 Fordham L Rev.
525,555 (1999).
34. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. I
Rev. 1521, 1524-25 (1981) (discussing the prosecutor's broad discretion in deciding
whether to charge a witness, what charges to bring, and when to offer a plea bargain).
35. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 32, at 59.
36. Indigent defendants who are represented by public defenders suffer the most
in this respect. They have no funds to pay for investigations and the attorneys who
represent them are overworked and in most cases do not have the opportunity to
spend much time preparing a defense. See Green, Justice, supra note 31, at 626.
37. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 32, at 54-55.
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additional obligations and responsibilities on them s.3  The ABA
mentions the prosecutor's unique duty to seek justice in the Canons,"
in the Model Code,40 and in the Model Rules. 41 Although the term
"justice" is very ambiguous 42 and the ethics rules provide very little
guidance to prosecutors on its meaning,43 it is clear that prosecutors
are expected to provide defendants with certain assistance in an
attempt to alleviate the inherent imbalance between the two sides.
The Model Rules contain specific provisions designed to combat this
38. Model Rule 3.8 provides that:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of
the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important
pretrial rights, such as the right to preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused... ;
(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the
prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement
that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6;
(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to
present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor
reasonably believes: (1) the information sought is not protected from
disclosure by any applicable privilege; (2) the evidence sought is
essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or
prosecution; and (3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the
information.
(g) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate
law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments
that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation
of the accused.
Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8.
39. Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 5 (1908) ("The primary duty of a lawyer
engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done.").
40. Model Code, supra note 22, EC 7-13 ("The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not
merely to convict.").
41. See Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8 cmt. ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); see also
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 693, 695 (1987) ("The prosecutor's role as an advocate is
tempered by an obligation of fairness, a duty to ensure that each trial results in an
accurate determination of guilt and punishment.").
42. See Melilli, supra note 12, at 679.
43. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 32, at 46 ("Although the special
prosecutorial duty is worded so vaguely that it obviously requires further explanation,
the codes provide remarkably little guidance on its meaning. In effect, code drafters
have delegated to prosecutors the task of resolving the special ethical issues
prosecutors face at every stage of trial.").
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uneven treatment,' and they explicitly state that a prosecutor has a
role distinct from that of an ordinary attorney participating in the
criminal justice system. 5 Model Rule 3.8, which is entitled Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, provides in the comment that "[a]
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice
and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence."'
As with the ethical obligations, the common thread that runs
through the legal obligations applied to prosecutors is the notion of
protecting the integrity of the process. The legal restrictions stem
from both criminal procedure law and judicial case law. For example,
criminal procedure law requires the government, upon request, to
produce documents to the defendant that are material to the defense
or will be used as evidence by the prosecution." Similarly, judicial
opinions formulate restrictions and obligations for prosecutors in their
holdings.48 The Court's decision in Berger v. United States,49 for
example, stated that a prosecutor has an obligation to see that justice
is done.50 In addition to defining the prosecutor's role in Berger, the
Supreme Court also set guidelines for prosecutors to follow in order
to achieve this duty to seek justice.5 Furthermore, as set forth in
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,5 judges can publicly "chastise
44. See Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8; see also infra Part I.B.1 (providing
further discussion of these provisions).
45. Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8 cmt. para. 1.
46. Id.
47. See Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 16(a).
48 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (establishing a prosecutor's duty
to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence that is material to the guilt or
punishment of the defendant); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)
(mentioning the duty of the prosecutor to refrain from improper methods designed to
obtain a wrongful conviction).
49. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
50. The Court stated:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall wvin a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones.
Id. at 88.
51. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976)
(holding that the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda
silence was a violation of Due Process); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)
(holding that the prosecutor's comments regarding the failure of the defendant to
testify was a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination).
52. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
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[prosecutors] in a published opinion" for professional misconduct,
allowing "the court to focus on the culpable individual rather than
granting a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant."53
Because the more stringent legal and ethical requirements imposed
on prosecutors share the same goal, they sometimes overlap. One of
the most notable obligations imparted on prosecuting attorneys both
legally and ethically is the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense.' A prosecutor must assist the defense in the preparation of
its case by providing evidence that is favorable to the accused."
1. Ethical Obligation: Rule 3.8(d)
A prosecutor's ethical disclosure obligations, established by the
ABA in 1908, pre-date the Court's decision in Brady.6 Since the
inception of the ethics rules, the ABA has sought to create a higher
standard of behavior for prosecutors. 7 For example, the Canons
provided special instructions for criminal prosecutors. Canon 5 states
that "[t]he primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts
or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of
the accused is highly reprehensible. 58  This coupling in the ethics
rules of the general requirement to seek justice with the specific
prohibition against withholding facts or witnesses favorable to the
defense, highlights the importance of disclosure.
In subsequent redrafts of the ethics rules, this standard continued to
be of the utmost importance. The Model Code and the Model Rules
both advise that, in conjunction with their duty to do justice,
prosecutors are required to disclose evidence favorable to the
defense. 9  For example, the Model Code contains an Ethical
Consideration stating the special duty of a public prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. 60 The rationale
53. Id. at 263.
54. See Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8(d); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Exculpatory
evidence is defined as evidence "which tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant
from alleged fault or guilt." Black's Law Dictionary 566 (6th ed. 1990).
55. See Freedman, supra note 10, at 214, stating that:
[T]he defense attorney is entitled, and may be professionally bound, to
withhold material evidence; defense counsel may advise a guilty defendant
to remain silent and put the government to its proof. The Constitution
guarantees the defendant nothing less. The prosecutor, however, is not
similarly entitled to withhold material evidence. Indeed, she is forbidden to
do so.
Id. (footnote omitted).
56. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
57. See Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 5 (1908).
58. Id.
59. Model Code, supra note 22, DR 7-103(B); Model Rules, supra note 2, R.
3.8(d).
60. Model Code, supra note 22, EC 7-13.
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underlying the Ethical Consideration is the idea that the prosecutor
represents a sovereign.61 Additionally, the corresponding Disciplinary
Rule requires the timely disclosure of evidence "that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce
the punishment."'  Similarly, Model Rule 3.8 sets forth the special
responsibilities of a prosecutor. Rule 3.8(d) provides in pertinent
part:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and,
in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor.63
A review of the ABA model ethics rules, therefore, clearly indicates
that the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the
defense is an inherent and important part of a prosecutor's ethical
responsibilities.
2. Legal Obligation: The Brady Rule
In Brady v. Maryland, the Court attempted to ensure a fair process
for the defendant by requiring prosecutors to disclose evidence to the
defense that could assist the defendant.' Brady and its progeny
established what is commonly referred to as the "Brady Rule": that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to disclosure of
exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment.' While
the decisions prior to Brady focused on the intentional misconduct of
the prosecutors, the Brady Court was primarily concerned with harm
to the defendant resulting from nondisclosure. 6 The Brady Court
ruled that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates Due Process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution." 6 The Supreme Court held that the
61. Id.
62. Id. DR 7-103.
63. Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8(d).
64. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963).
65. For subsequent cases that have expanded the Court's holding in Brady see
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
66. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
67. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not





suppression of favorable evidence violated Brady's rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 69
Since its decision in Brady, the Court has continued to expand the
prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.70 In
United States v. Agurs,7" the Court held that "there is no significant
difference between cases in which there has been merely a general
request for exculpatory matter and cases... in which there has been
no request at all.""2 Thus, the Agurs Court accepted the argument
that the Brady Rule applies even when no specific request for
evidence has been made. The Court also stated, however, that "the
prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure
unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of
the defendant's right to a fair trial."73
Subsequently, in United States v. Bagley,74 the Court concluded that
there is no difference between impeachment evidence and
exculpatory evidence with respect to prosecutorial disclosure
obligations.7 Accordingly, the Court held that evidence that would
be useful to impeach a prosecution witness also falls within the scope
of the Brady Rule.76 Additionally, the Court restricted the materiality
standard, stating that "evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' By
imposing such a narrow definition, the Court created a "very
demanding standard of materiality" 8 that makes it difficult for a
defendant to establish a violation of his Due Process rights under the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments as required to be granted a new
trial.7 '
Ten years after Bagley, in Kyles v. Whitley,"° the Court once again
addressed the issue of the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory
69. Id. at 86. The Due Process Clause states that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend.
XIV.
70. See supra note 65.
71. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
72. Id. at 107.
73. Id. at 108.
74. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
75. Id. at 676. Impeachment of a witness is "[tlo call in question the veracity of a
witness, by means of evidence adduced for such purpose, or the adducing of proof
that a witness is unworthy of belief." Black's Law Dictionary 753 (6th ed. 1990).
76. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
77. Id. at 682.
78. Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of
the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev.
833, 902 (1997).
79. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards For Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 851, 907-10
(1995).
80. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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evidence.8' In Kyles, the Court reaffirmed its previous decisions in
Brady, Agurs, and Bagley and summarized the Brady Rule,"- stating
that "[w]hile the definition of Bagley materiality in terms of the
cumulative effect of suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving
the government with a degree of discretion, it must also be
understood as imposing a corresponding burden."'  Moreover, the
Court held that the scope of the Brady Rule extends to evidence that
is known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor.'
Therefore, a "prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police."'
Brady and its progeny established a prosecutor's constitutional duty
to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence when it is in her
possession or in the possession of the police. This obligation, unique
to prosecutors, is widely deemed necessary for a defendant to receive
a fair trial. Yet, as important as this duty is, it is severely limited by
the materiality requirement.86 In cases where a prosecutor has
intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence, a conviction will not be
overturned if that evidence is not deemed material because the
defendant was not actually prejudiced.
While the Supreme Court requires prosecutors to disclose certain
evidence to the defense, consequences for withholding such evidence
do not exist in the criminal justice system. In fact, the Supreme
Court has granted prosecutors absolute immunity from civil liability
for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. 88 Thus, prosecutors do
not fear being sued for withholding evidence and the Brady Rule is
consequently weakened. As one commentator stated, "[i]nsofar as
federal law is concerned, we have no reason at all to believe, under
these circumstances, that prosecutors will not continue to ignore their
constitutional obligation under Brady."'  Consequently,
encouragement for prosecutors to adhere to this requirement must be
found elsewhere. Ideally, the ethics rules would supply this incentive.
81. Id. at 421.
82. Id. at 432-38.
83. Id. at 437.
84. Id at 438.
85. Id. at 437.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
87. See Weeks, supra note 78, at 878 ("[T]he prospect of a civil suit under federal
law for a Brady violation simply does not exist. We will have to look elsewhere to
discover the incentive for prosecutors to comply with their constitutional obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence.").
88. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Bruce A. Green,
Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 79 n.54 (1995) [hereinafter Green,
Enforcement] (stating that "prosecutors have absolute immunity for misconduct
related to their prosecutorial function").
89. Weeks, supra note 78, at 902.
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3. Differing Obligations Under the Brady Rule and Rule 3.8(d)
While Rule 3.8(d) and the Brady Rule both require prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence, significant differences remain between
the two. Rule 3.8(d) is narrower than the Brady Rule in that the
ethics rule does not require a prosecutor to provide the defendant
with impeachment evidence, as Bagley requiresf 0 Furthermore, the
ethics rule does not hold the prosecutor responsible for evidence that
is only in the possession of the police. The prosecutor is not ethically
required to search for evidence favorable to the defense as required
under Kyles.91
Conversely, however, Rule 3.8(d) is broader than the Brady Rule in
some significant respectsY2 Model Rule 3.8(d) states that a prosecutor
must disclose to the defense "all evidence or information known to
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense."'93 Thus, unlike the Brady Rule which states
that no Due Process violation occurs for failure to produce
exculpatory evidence if the evidence is not material to the defendant's
guilt or punishment, Rule 3.8 does not have a materiality
requirement.94 As a result, cases exist in which a prosecutor's willful
failure to turn over evidence favorable to the accused will not warrant
a reversal of the conviction because the evidence is found to be
immaterial to the defendant's case,95 and thus does not amount to a
Brady violation, while the same conduct is a violation of Model Rule
3.8(d) .9 6
In addition, Rule 3.8(d) states that a prosecutor must, in connection
with sentencing, "disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all
unprivileged mitigating information known .... "I This ethical
requirement to disclose information to the defense for the purpose of
sentencing the defendant cannot be found in the Brady line of cases.9
The ethical standard therefore again requires disclosure beyond the
legal requirements of the Brady Rule.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79 for a discussion of Bagley.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85 for a dicussion of Kyles.
92. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 714; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W.
William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct § 3.8:501 (2d ed. 1998 Supp.) (stating that rule 3.8(d) is broader
than the Brady Rule on which it is based).
93. Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8(d) (emphasis added).
94. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 714.
95. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 438
(1992) ("[U]nder the Supreme Court's current disclosure rules, the prosecutor's
decision to suppress favorable evidence would be a perfectly rational, albeit unethical,
act." (footnote omitted)).
96. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 714 ("An ethical violation can, and often will, be
present even when due process is not violated.").
97. Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8(d).
98. See supra note 65.
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Scholars note that "[a] significant gap exists between the
performance the Constitution requires of a prosecutor and the higher
standard compelled by the rules of professional responsibility." 99 The
existence of this gap begs the question of whether a prosecutor should
understand her disclosure obligation to go only as far as the standard
the Supreme Court set forth in Brady or as far as the more liberal
ethical obligations. Obviously, the answer to this question is of the
utmost importance to prosecutors, as it creates the standard to which
a prosecutor must adhere. The next part discusses how Rule 3.8(d)
functions in practice. It explains that this rule is under-enforced,
raising the issue of whether the purpose of the rule is being served.
C. Enforcement
The ethics rules serve a variety of functions, including providing an
interpretation of the rules for the practice of law and detecting and
providing a remedy for violations of those rules."°K Theoretically, the
rules not only provide a basis for personal discipline of attorneys but
also serve to educate lawyers about their ethical obligations, which
exist in addition to their legal obligations.
One of the key functions of the ethics rules is to set the norms of
conduct and provide a standard for professional discipline.'10 Absent
a vehicle for personal discipline, punishment for prosecutorial
misconduct would only be available through the reversal of a
conviction."°  The Supreme Court has found, however, that the
reversal of a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct is not
appropriate where the misconduct is deemed harmless error.1-3
Where there is no denial of Due Process, the courts owe an obligation
to society to uphold convictions and not reverse just to punish an
unethical prosecutor.10 Because cases arise where it is appropriate to
99. Meares, supra note 79, at 909.
100. See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 38 ("Lawyer regulation is not a unitary
task.... The basic sub-tasks are: (1) making rules for law practice; (2) interpreting
rules; (3) detecting rule violations; (4) determining 'guilt' when lawyers are charged
with violations; (5) designing remedies or sanctions; and (6) imposing them in specific
cases.").
101. See id., Freedman, supra note 10, at 1 ("Disciplinary sanctions against lawyers
include private reprimands, public censure, suspensions of the right to practice, and
disbarment.").
102. See Weeks, supra note 78, at 870.
103. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983). The Court stated that
"deterrence is an inappropriate basis for reversal ... where means more narrowly
tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are available." Id. In a footnote
the Court indicates that the trial court could have dealt with the misconduct through
professional discipline. ld. at n.5. See generally Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless
Error, Prosecutorial Misconduc and Due Process: There's More to Due Process Than
the Bottom Line, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1298, 1298 (1988) (arguing that -harmless error"
test should be applied to misconduct after analysis of conduct under notions of fair
play and standards of professional conduct).
104. See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 506.
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discipline a prosecutor, but inappropriate to overturn the conviction,
the ethics rules provide a way to punish for misconduct.
Professional discipline of prosecutors serves multiple functions.
First, it provides incentive for prosecutors to follow the ethical rules
adopted by the court because failure to do so could result in a
personal sanction even where there is no Due Process violation." 5
Because of the stringent materiality standard imposed by Brady, even
where it is clear that a prosecutor has knowingly withheld exculpatory
evidence, such conduct may not rise to the level of a Due Process
violation.10 6 In such a case, without an ethics rule, the court has no
means to sanction such clearly unethical conduct.'
In addition, the ethics rules allow courts to identify lawless lawyers
and sanction them accordingly. 0 8 Critics, however, argue that Rule
3.8(d) is not very effective in serving this purpose.109 Although Brady-
type"0 violations are believed to be quite common,"' the ethics rules
are rarely enforced and prosecutors are rarely disciplined for such
violations."' In his notable 1987 article, Professor Richard A. Rosen
addressed the overwhelming lack of discipline for Brady-type
violations.' Professor Rosen thoroughly researched how effectively
the disciplinary rules were applied for Brady-type misconduct.114 An
exhaustive search turned up surprisingly few cases in which
prosecutorial misconduct was found."5 Furthermore, the punishment
for the few instances of misconduct appeared to be quite weak.1 6
Thus, when a prosecutor must determine whether to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence, she has no personal incentive to
105. See Weeks, supra note 78, at 898 ("[Elven if the prospect of meaningful
sanction is remote, the mere fact of having to respond to charges might of itself be an
effective deterrent to such abuse.").
106. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
108. See Schneyer, supra note 26, at 38.
109. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 697.
110. This term is used by Professor Richard A. Rosen to describe violations by
prosecutors where a reversal of a conviction is not warranted. See id. at 696.
111. Meares, supra note 79, at 909.
112. Rosen, supra note 41, at 697.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 696-97.
115. Id. at 697.
116. See id. at 720-29. In 1997, Professor Joseph R. Weeks updated Professor
Rosen's article and found no increase in the frequency of the discipline of prosecutors
for Brady-type violations. See Weeks, supra note 78, at 844-71. Professor Weeks
reviewed cases decided subsequent to Professor Rosen's article and found only seven
additional cases where prosecutors were disciplined for failure to disclose exculpatory
material, and the sanctions for these violations were very weak. In the ten years since
Professor Rosen addressed this issue there still appeared to be a startling lack of
enforcement of this rule for Brady-type misconduct. Id.; see also Meares, supra note
79, at 909 (Professor Tracey L. Meares attributes the lax enforcement to the gap
between the disclosure obligations under the Brady Rule and the ethics rules).
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encourage her to disclose this evidence to the defense." 7 Moreover,
when the prosecution's case is weak, there may be a significant risk
that disclosing the evidence will severely harm the case." 8  A
prosecutor may see obvious advantages to withholding such evidence
when there is no serious risk of repercussion. Hence, it is easy to see
why a prosecutor who believes in the guilt of the defendant would
choose not to disclose exculpatory evidence. Even if the prosecutor's
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is discovered, the worst-case
scenario for the prosecutor is that the conviction will be overturned on
appeal and the defendant will be granted a new trial, which is an
unlikely result."9 On the other hand, the prosecutor may fear that she
will not win a conviction if she does disclose the evidence.' -°
Furthermore, "[i]t is also likely that in most cases the prosecutor
believes the defendant is guilty, and therefore might be motivated by
the concern that, in one sense, justice will not be served by revealing
evidence which will increase the probability that the defendant will go
free."'' Moreover, a prosecutor may not even realize that she has an
ethical obligation to turn over evidence beyond what is required
under the Brady Rule, because new prosecutors are given little or no
education regarding prosecutorial ethics." The broader disclosure
requirements of Rule 3.8(d) and the lack of enforcement of this rule
begs the question of whether prosecutors should really be required to
disclose evidence beyond what they are already required to disclose
under the Brady Rule and if not, whether it is appropriate to change
the ethical requirement to match the legal standard.
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT
There is a controversy regarding the necessity of a materiality
requirement that would limit a prosecutor's ethical duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence. This part addresses the arguments in support of
and against adding a materiality requirement to Rule 3.8(d) or
eliminating the rule altogether. This part first presents the arguments
in favor of adding a materiality requirement and therefore proposes
that the rule is unnecessary. This part further argues that the Brady
limit is the correct ethical standard because the proper balance has
already been established, there may be constitutional problems with
requiring broader disclosure, enforcement is lax, and prosecutors look
117. See Meares, supra note 79, at 907-11 (proposing the creation of a financial
incentive system to encourage prosecutors to act ethically).
118. Gershman, supra note 95, at 438.
119. See id
120. Id. ("If the case is weak, disclosure might destroy any chance for a
conviction.").
121. Rosen, supra note 41, at 732.
122. See Melilli, supra note 12, at 686 (explaining that young lawyers entering into




to the legal requirements for their disclosure obligations. This part
then addresses the arguments in favor of keeping the rule unchanged,
stating that because the ethics rule establishes a different standard,
has historical significance, serves to guide prosecutors, and directs the
actions of the prosecutor going forward, a different standard of
disclosure should apply. This Note concludes that Rule 3.8(d) should
remain in effect to guide prosecutors and to set a higher ethical
standard.
A. Arguments in Favor of Eliminating Rule 3.8(d) or Amending it to
Include a Materiality Requirement
Arguably, the ethical disclosure obligation should be limited by the
materiality requirement of the Brady rule. Because the rule is
superfluous, the proper balance for a fair trial has already been set by
the Supreme Court and legislators, courts exercising their ethics
authority may lack the constitutional authority to require a prosecutor
to disclose evidence beyond what is required by the legal
requirements, the rule is under-enforced and the additional disclosure
requirement may be part of the cause, and prosecutors look to the
legal rules to determine their disclosure obligations are significant
reasons in favor limiting the breadth of the rule.
First, Model Rule 3.8(d) may be unnecessary. An ethical
requirement that a prosecutor disclose exculpatory evidence may be
found in the Model Rules outside of Rule 3.8(d). Model Rule 3.4,
entitled Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel, establishes the
ethical duty of a lawyer in the adversary system.lu Rule 3.4(c)
requires that a lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal.... "124 Similarly, Model Rule 8.4
provides a catch-all that makes it unethical to "engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.""1  Brady and its
progeny established that exculpatory, material evidence in a
prosecutor's possession must be disclosed to the defense.126
Accordingly, the failure of a prosecutor to disclose such evidence
would be a violation of Rule 3.4(c) and Rule 8.4(d). Therefore, even
without Rule 3.8(d), a prosecutor is ethically required to comply with
her Brady obligations and 3.8(d) may not be necessary.
Secondly, both Congress and the Supreme Court have considered
the question of prosecutorial disclosure and have already created the
rules that they consider appropriate.127  As such, Congress and the
Supreme Court have already established the proper balance to ensure
123. See Model Rules, supra note 2, at R. 3.4.
124. Id. R. 3.4(c).
125. Id. R. 8.4(d).
126. See supra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963).
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a fair trial.' Arguably, the ethics rule should not require more from a
prosecutor than is required under Due Process. As the Supreme
Court clearly stated in Agurs: "there is... no duty to provide defense
counsel with unlimited discovery of everything known by the
prosecutor."129 More stringent ethical requirements allow a court to
exercise its supervisory authority to demand more disclosure from
prosecutors than the legal requirements do, which some argue is an
inappropriate use of the courts' ethics authority.
A third argument in favor of limiting the disclosure obligation is
that there may be constitutional issues that interfere with a court
exercising its ethics authority in this manner. State courts have
supervisory authority over prosecutors within the state, yet courts may
not have the constitutional authority to regulate the discovery
obligations of a prosecutor beyond what is required by Due Process
and state criminal procedure rules. The requirements of Rule 3.8(d)
closely resemble rules of criminal procedure and procedural rules are
promulgated by the state legislature. It is therefore unclear whether
the courts supervisory authority to govern attorney conduct includes
the authority to impose discovery obligations on a prosecutor or
whether this authority is limited by the separation of powers
doctrine."3 A court may be hesitant to test its power because it is
unclear whether it has the constitutional authority to require further
disclosure. In addition, the Supremacy Clause may prevent a federal
court from enforcing a disclosure requirement that extends beyond
the Brady Rule. Where state rules conflict with the Federal
Constitution or federal legislation, 3 the Supremacy Clause supports
application of federal law." At present, it is unclear whether a state
court has the constitutional authority to require disclosure beyond
that required under the Constitution or the Federal Rules. 3
Furthermore, the Citizens Protection Act of 1998 ("CPA") subjects
federal prosecutors and other government attorneys to the state laws
128. See John M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul
Blows," 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 271,275 (1992) ("As a practical matter, the [ethical] rules
are an undisguised effort by the defense bar to undo what both Congress and the
Supreme Court have declared to be the law." (quoting Joint Press Release from the
U.S. Dep't of Justice, the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys General, and the Nat'l District Att'ys
Ass'n 1 (Aug. 6, 1991))).
129. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
130. Wolfram, supra note 33, at 57 (noting that the adoption of the ethics rules has
"raised a number of difficult legal issues, not all of which have been satisfactorily
resolved.").
131. E.g. Fed. R Crim. P. 16.
132. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal
Prosecutors, 88 Georgetown L.J. 207, 248 (2000); Williams, supra note 28, at 3446.
133. See Green, Enforcement, supra note 88, at 90-91 ("It is generally, although not
universally, accepted that state disciplinary agencies may sanction state prosecutors




and rules and local federal court rules that govern all attorneys in the
state."3 Traditionally, federal prosecutors did not consider themselves
subject to the ethics rules of the states in which they practiced. 13 The
recent adoption of the CPA will subject federal prosecutors to Rule
3.8(d), which raises jurisdictional questions regarding what happens
when state courts, federal courts, Congress and the Justice
Department create conflicting rules. 136 The question of who has the
authority to regulate federal prosecutors remains unanswered, and the
issue will remain so as long as different ethical guidelines apply to
prosecutors.1 37  Therefore, limiting the breadth of the ethical
disclosure obligation to include the materiality requirement will
eliminate the confusion that surrounds the conflicting rules and
provide an ethics rule that is consistent with the legal requirements.
A forth argument in favor of limiting the disclosure requirement of
the ethics rule stresses that the rule as currently written lacks real
teeth and is severely under-enforced. Professor Meares suggests that
"[t]he frequency of Brady-type misconduct ... likely is due in part to
the lack of effective sanctions for such conduct.' ' 3  Courts may be
hesitant to punish for violations of a rule that reaches beyond the legal
obligation of Brady because they are unsure whether the broad
disclosure required under Rule 3.8(d) is appropriate. In order to
provide a rule that will be enforced the ethics rule should be limited to
include a materiality requirement, which would eliminate any
questions surrounding the breadth of a prosecutor's disclosure
obligation. A uniform rule of disclosure may provide an ethics rule
that is more likely to be enforced.
Finally, Rule 3.8(d) does not serve its educational purpose. 3 9
Prosecutors' behavior indicates that when they look to their disclosure
obligations they focus on following the Brady Rule and the rules of
disclosure under criminal procedure law, because these rules are
134. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West 2000 Supp.).
135. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 132, at 228. Part of the justification for this
unique treatment of federal prosecutors is that they are subject to the internal
guidelines of the Department of Justice, which include ethical rules. Dep't. of Justice
Manual, Tit. 9. The Department of Justice Manual, however, does not have a specific
policy regarding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in general. The Department
does have a policy requiring the disclosure of exculpatory evidence to a Grand Jury.
Dep't of Justice Manual § 9-11.233 (Supp. 1992). In addition, the Department has a
policy requiring disclosure of potential impeachment information by law enforcement
agencies to prosecutors. Dep't of Justice Manual § 9-5.100 (1999); see Zacharias &
Green, supra note 132, at 238-39.
136. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 132, at 245-46.
137. See id. at 259. The jurisdictional issues discussed are beyond the scope of this
Note. In their article, Professors Zacharias and Green address the many facets of this
complex issue without attempting to provide a resolution. Id. at 247.
138. Meares, supra note 79, at 909; see also Weeks, supra note 78, at 869-70 (noting
that the Brady Rule is so often ignored due in most part to "the lack of any real
incentive" to comply with the rule).
139. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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enforced more often and prosecutors are concerned about significant
repercussions from a violation of their legal disclosure obligations.
Alternatively, no real threat of a sanction for a violation of the ethical
duty to disclose arises, and therefore, the ethical rule is essentially
ignored. Absent consequences, a prosecutor has no reason to follow
the ethics rules and may not even be aware that the requirements of
the ethics rules are any different from the obligations under Brady.
Thus, the Rule's educational function is not being served.
The ABA can opt to eliminate Rule 3.8(d) altogether or it can
choose to amend Rule 3.8(d) and narrow the scope of the ethics rule
so that it complies with Brady. Since Rule 3.8(d) requires more than
is required by both Congress and the Supreme Court, is under-
enforced, and serves no real educational purpose, there are strong
arguments that it should either be eliminated or limited so that a
prosecutor is not ethically required to disclose any more evidence
than she is legally required to disclose under Brady. There are,
however, several strong arguments that advocate the importance of an
ethics rule for disclosure without a materiality limitation and therefore
support keeping Rule 3.8(d) unchanged.
B. Arguments in Favor of Keeping Rule 3.8(d)
Although Rule 3.8(d) receives criticism from some scholars, others
argue that the rule serves several important purposes and should
therefore remain unmodified. Although providing enforceable rules
is a desirable objective, it is not the only goal of the ethics rules, which
exist in part to guide lawyers and encourage ethical behavior. As one
commentator states, "[t]o the extent the professional codes
appropriately rest on the assumption that lawyers vill respond to
guidance, clear rules and punishment for violation of those rules are
not always necessary to produce desirable conduct."'" Scholars argue
that the ethics rules serve a different purpose than Due Process and
thus a different standard is appropriate. In addition, history indicates
that the ABA intentionally drafted Rule 3.8(d) with this broader
disclosure obligation and the rule serves as an aspirational guide,
which is an important purpose beyond providing an enforceable rule.
Moreover, the ethics rule proscribes a prosecutor's disclosure
requirements at the beginning of a case going forvard, while the
materiality requirement of the Brady Rule sets the standard for the
reversal of a conviction after trial on appeal and therefore different
treatment of the obligations is appropriate.
First, some argue that the ethics rules generally, and Rule 3.8
especially, exist to set a different and higher ethical standard than the
140. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L Rev. 223, 236.
(1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Ethics].
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minimal standards set by the Supreme Court. 14' The ethics rules exist
to set a higher level of conduct to which a prosecutor should aspire,
not the minimal acceptable standard of behavior to avoid a Due
Process violation. 142  According to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit:
The Constitution defines only the "minimal historic safeguards"
which defendants must receive rather than the outer bounds of those
we may afford them. In other words, the Constition prescribes a
floor below which prosecutions may not fall, rather than a ceiling
beyond which they may not rise. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, on the other hand.... is designed to safeguard the
integrity of the profession and preserve public confidence in our
system of justice.... Hence, the Code secures protections not
contemplated by the Constitution. 43
Similarly, Professor Meares argues in favor of separate treatment
by the courts of the ethical requirements imposed on a prosecutor and
the constitutional minimums.'" According to this view, the ethics
rules should not just match the constitutional requirements set by the
Supreme Court, but they should require more to encourage attorneys
to act ethically. 45 Thus, in terms of the ethical duty to seek justice, the
ethical obligation of the prosecutor to provide favorable evidence to
the defense should not be limited by the materiality requirement of
the Brady Rule.
In addition, individual rules, such as Rule 3.8(d), help guide a
prosecutor toward her more general ethical obligation to serve as a
"minister of justice. ' 146 For example, Professor Zacharias examined
the purpose of ethics rules and stated that, according to the traditional
view, the ethics rules "represent ideals and a model for practice." '47
Professor Schneyer explained that professional "discipline is meant to
deter, incapacitate, or even rehabilitate, but does little to remedy a
victim's loss. '' "4 Accordingly, the purpose of the ethics rules is quite
different than the purpose of the Due Process Clause. The
defendant's right under the Due Process Clause entitles him to a new
trial when he has been denied a fair trial,149 but the ethics rules instead
seek to punish or deter misconduct on the part of the prosecutor.
While the Due Process Clause focuses on the defendant's remedy, the
ethics rules focus on the attorney's conduct.
141. See Meares, supra note 79, at 909.
142. See id. at 910-11.
143. United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1988).
144. See Meares, supra note 79, at 910-11.
145. See id.
146. Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8 cmt.; see Green, Justice, supra note 31, at
617.
147. Zacharias, Ethics, supra note 140, at 226.
148. Schneyer, supra note 26, at 49.
149. See supra note 69.
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Second, the ABA has historically chosen to highlight the
prosecutors duty to disclose as an especially important obligation,",
which suggests that Rule 3.8(d) should remain in force as it stands.
The language of Rule 3.8(d) indicates that the ABA intended to
create an ethics rule with different disclosure obligations from
constitutional requirements of the Brady Rule. At the time the Model
Rules were drafted, the Court had already established the
constitutional requirements for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence
in Brady and Agurs.15I Although the Court included the materiality
requirement in these cases, significantly the ABA omitted it from
Rule 3.8(d). Clearly, when Rule 3.8(d) was first written, therefore, the
drafters intended that the ethics rule require a prosecutor to disclose
favorable evidence without considering materiality.
The legislative history and the intent of the ABA House of
Delegates at the time of drafting of the rules also show an intention
not to limit the ethical obligation to disclose evidence. The legislative
history states that in the drafting of Model Rule 3.8(d) "[t]he language
was changed slightly from 'supports innocence' to 'tends to negate the
guilt of the accused' to impose a greater obligation of disclosure on
the prosecution. Also, the scope of the duty to disclose was expanded
to include 'information' as well as 'evidence."" Twenty years after
Brady was decided, the House of Delegates voted to expand the scope
of the disclosure obligation in the Model Rules,'5 3 showing the ABA's
desire to provide a broader requirement for disclosure under the
Model Rules than that already required under Brady. Therefore,
declining to change the rule is consistent with the intentions of the
Rule's initial drafters, who presumably wanted the ethical obligations
to be broader than the legal obligations.
Third, although violations of the ethics rule are dramatically under-
enforced,' eliminating this rule or changing it to match the Brady
requirements is not necessarily the proper solution for such lax
enforcement. Arguably, changing the rule will have very little or no
effect on prosecutorial misconduct. Scholars have noted that many
ethics rules are rarely enforced, particularly those rules that are
specific to prosecutors.155 Therefore, lax enforcement may not be a
150. See Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 5 (1908) ("The primary duty of a lawyer
engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence
of the accused is highly reprehensible."); supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
151. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
152. Center for Prof'l Responsibility, ABA, The Legislative History of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Their Development in the ABA House of Delegates
Proposed Rule 3.8 (Discussion Draft 1983) 141 (1987).
153. See id.
154. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
155. See Green, Enforcement, supra note 88, at 89-90; Gershman, supra note 95, at
444-45; Zacharias, Justice, supra note 32, at 104-07.
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problem specific to this particular rule but a failure of the ethics rules
in general. In addition, this rule is rarely enforced even where there
are clear violations of both the ethics and Brady obligations, 56
therefore, it is unclear what changing the rule will achieve.
Accordingly, eliminating this rule or changing it to include a
materiality requirement may not remedy the problem.
Finally, when a prosecutor must decide whether to disclose
evidence to the defense, she should not consider the question in terms
of the outcome of the trial and the possibility of an appeal. Under
Rule 3.8(d) a prosecutor must disclose "all evidence.., that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense,"'57 whereas a
defendant's constitutional right is only violated where the evidence
withheld is shown to be material to the defendant's case.'58 As such,
the constitutional requirement establishes a standard of conduct
below which a prosecutor cannot fall without violating the rights of
the defendant.'59 The ethics rule, however, aims for a higher standard.
The materiality requirement in the Brady Rule creates a harmless
error rule where the case is reviewed after the fact, and no violation
exists unless the defendant has been injured by the failure to
disclose."6 By comparison, the ethics rules guide prosecutors on what
they are required to disclose at the beginning of the case.' 61
The ethical rules thus direct the forward action of a prosecutor by
setting guidelines for disclosure prior to trial. Conversely, Due
Process claims for reversal of a conviction are reviewed after the fact.
As Professor Zacharias explains:
In assessing her obligation, the prosecutor must keep in mind the
difference between disclosing initially and reversing a conviction for
failure to disclose. Most of the standards set by case law arise from
the latter context.... An ethical prosecutor, in deciding whether to
disclose, must focus on whether adversarial equality mandates
disclosure, rather than whether nondisclosure would result in
reversal.162
This difference suggests that a different standard should apply to the
ethics rule, a standard which does not limit the ethics rule to what will
be held to be material after trial. A prosecutor should understand her
ethical obligation to be disclosure of any evidence that may assist the
defendant's case, not only the evidence the prosecutor believes will be
material to the defendant's case.
156. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
157. Model Rules, supra note 2, R. 3.8(d).
158. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
159. See supra text accompanying note 143.
160. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bagley.
161. See Zacharias, Justice, supra note 32, at 84 n.172.
162. Id.
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It is counterintuitive to require the same standard of behavior for
prosecutors in a rule where the behavior is reviewed after the fact and
when the rule prescribes the proper behavior going forward. 63 Two
separate standards are necessary. It is logical to have a rule that
examines the situation after the fact to provide for reversal of a
conviction only upon a showing that the evidence withheld was
material to the defendant's case. It is similarly logical for a rule that
prescribes proper conduct before the fact to have a different standard
of conduct, one that does not evaluate the evidence in terms of
whether or not it was material to proving the defendant's guilt or
innocence, but only whether or not the evidence may be helpful to the
defense.
Convictions are not overturned just to prove a point when a
prosecutor has clearly misbehaved. 6 There should be an additional
basis of punishment in the form of a personal sanction to encourage
prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory evidence prior to trial. These
sanctions would prevent prosecutors from suppressing evidence in the
hope that it will not be discovered or will be deemed immaterial. In
deciding what to disclose, a prosecutor should be forced to err on the
side of disclosure.
Additionally, without Rule 3.8(d) there would be no way to
discipline prosecutors for the failure to disclose evidence absent a
Brady violation. Because the Brady Rule is commonly violated
without consequences, 165 it is fair to conclude that many situations
arise in which a prosecutor has withheld exculpatory evidence but the
failure to disclose did not rise to the level of a Brady violation. In
such a situation, when the defendant has not been prejudiced and it is
clearly inappropriate to grant the defendant a new trial, the
prosecutor has still engaged in misconduct; even where there has been
no Due Process violation, it is desirable to deter prosecutors from
suppressing evidence. Without an ethics rule that is broader in scope
than the legal obligation, there would be no means to discipline
prosecutors for prosecutorial misconduct absent a Due Process
violation.
When deciding what evidence to disclose, a prosecutor should also
be forced to err on the side of disclosure in order to preserve the
fairness of the process. Disclosure of any evidence that could be
favorable to the defense is not overly burdensome for the prosecution.
In fact, it is just the opposite. It is easier for a prosecutor to turn all
evidence over to the defense than to make a judgment call regarding
the materiality or the exculpatory nature of the evidence. A
prosecutor is not an unbiased party to the case and is therefore not in
163. See id
164. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
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a good position to make the determination of whether the evidence
would be material.166 The prosecutor may not be aware of the theory
behind the defense's case and therefore may not know whether a
certain piece of evidence would be helpful.
In addition, a prosecutor has a personal desire to win her case.
Many prosecutors are driven by the strongly held belief that the
defendant is guilty and therefore, giving the defense evidence that will
help its case is extremely difficult. It may be easy for a prosecutor
who wants to win a conviction to convince herself that the evidence is
immaterial.167 As such, a bright line rule like Rule 3.8(d) is desirable
because it does not allow the prosecutor to weigh materiality at all,
and it better ensures the fairness of the justice system.
The court's constant reminder of the prosecutor's duty to seek
justice, in addition to her role as advocate, reinforces the concept that
prosecutors must operate at a higher standard than other criminal
lawyers."6 The criminal justice system presupposes equality between
the prosecution and the defense and if this equality is not present, the
system will deteriorate. 169 In order to better balance the sides, the
prosecutor has an additional burden. The prosecutor's unique access
to information and resources includes the benefit of a police force to
perform their investigation. As a result, the prosecutor will often
know of the existence of evidence that is unknown to the defense.17
If this evidence is not shared with the defense, it may never be
revealed. For these reasons, the obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence should not be limited by what is required under the Brady
Rule but should include all exculpatory evidence. If it is fairness we
are seeking, then there is no reason for such a limit on the
prosecutor's ethical obligations. It is desirable for the guilty to be
convicted, but not at the expense of a fair process.
It will not be helpful to eliminate or modify Rule 3.8(d) and lower
the ethical standards set by the ABA. Changing the rule would
remove the benefits of having a broader rule that goes beyond the
constitutional requirements and encourages prosecutors to perform
their duty to seek justice, which is an integral part of their role as
prosecutors. The ABA should not lower the ceiling simply to meet
the floor. Instead, it should strive to find ways to raise the minimum
to meet the ideal. Rather than giving up a smartly crafted rule, the
166. Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs
Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 Fordham L. Rev.
391, 405-06 (1984) (advocating a requirement that a prosecutor submit the entire case
file to a court for in camera review).
167. Id. at 405.
168. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
169. See Freedman, supra note 10, at 213-15.
170. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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focus should be on better enforcement through greater vigilance and
stiffer sanctions.
Better education and informing prosecutors of their ethical
obligations will likely achieve more desirable results than including a
materiality limit on a prosecutor's duty to disclose. Prosecutors
entering the profession are currently given little or no training
regarding the ethical duty to disclose exculpatory evidence .' Nor are
prosecutors educated about how this duty differs from the legal
requirement of the Brady Rule." Educating prosecutors about this
additional ethical obligation and the policy reasons behind it is not
burdensome and would likely lead to fewer Brady violations in
addition to fewer occasions of ethical misconduct. It is also necessary
to train prosecutors as soon as they enter the office because once a
prosecutor is involved in a case it would be difficult, if not impossible,
for her to view the situation objectively and observe the need for
disclosure. There is every reason to believe that the majority of
prosecutors would follow the ethical guidelines if they understood
what was actually required.
CONCLUSION
Rule 3.8(d) should not be eliminated or amended to include a
materiality requirement. Instead it should remain in effect without a
materiality limitation because it sets a higher standard toward which a
prosecutor should strive. Although it frequently occurs in conjunction
with a Brady violation, prosecutorial misconduct is separate from a
Due Process violation and should therefore receive different
treatment through a different rule. The problem of lax enforcement
of Rule 3.8(d) will not be resolved by allowing prosecutors to
withhold non-material exculpatory evidence. Properly educating
prosecutors about this ethical obligation when they initially enter the
profession is likely to produce a more desirable result. Rule 3.8(d)
should therefore remain in the Model Rules as it is currently drafted.
171. See supra note 122 and accompanying text
172. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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